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Statement of the Case

(i)
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal taken by the state from a ruling by a District Court, in its
appellate capacity, reversing a Magistrate's decision denying a Motion to Suppress.
(ii)
Course of the Proceedings Below
The Respondent, Peggy Finnicum, was charged with excessive DUI on
September 25, 2005. R., p. 5. She entered a Not Guilty plea and filed a Motion to
Suppress and Amended Motion to Suppress challenging, for purposes of this appeal,
the constitutionality of the warrantless police entry into her home. R., pp. 17-20. A
hearing on the Motion was held on December 15, 2005, the Honorable Penny
Friedlander, Magistrate, presiding. R., pp. 23-26. On February 3, 2006, Judge
Friedlander denied the Motion, ruling that the police entry was lawful to effectuate
a Terry style seizure commenced outside the home. R., p. 32. Ms. Finnicum filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was heard on July 21, 2006. R., pp. 41-43. Judge
Friedlander denied the Motion, again ruling that the seizure was valid under Terry
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and then adding, as a "second basis" for her decision, that there was probable cause
to arrest. R., pp. 41.
Ms. Finnicum thereafter entered an approved Conditional Plea to the charge,
preserving her right to appeal from the denial of her Motion to Suppress. R., pp. 4346. After Judgment and Sentence was entered, a Notice of Appeal was timely filed.
R., pp. 51-52.
Judge Luster, sitting in his appellate capacity, heard oral argument and
announced his decision on February 1, 2007. R., 108; Tr., Proceedings. Judge
Luster reversed the decision denying the Motion to Suppress, ruling that although the
record supported a finding that there was probable cause to arrest for DUI, the
Magistrate made no findings, nor was there any factual record to support any
findings, that exigent circumstances existed that justified the warrantless entry into
Mr. Finnicum's home. R., p. 108, Tr., Proceedings, pp. 36-38. From this decision,
the state appeals. R., pp. 121-124.
(iii)
Statement of the Facts
The parties stipulated to the admission of the arresting officer's police report
as the factual record for the suppression issue, and that has been recited in the state's
Brief, and need not be repeated again. The Respondent points to certain salient facts
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set forth in that record which are important to this appeal. The arresting officer
arrived "on scene" at 1810 (6:10 p.m.) and first had contact with Mr. Finnicum at
1821 (6:21 p.m.). The alcohol breath test administered to Ms. Finnicum was at 1952
(7:52 p.m.) after she had been transported to the Kootenai County Jail. Neither
officer testified to any concerns about the loss of evidence as the reason the entering
Ms. Finnicum's home. Indeed, the only reason for entry came from the second
officer, a concern about "officer safety" because the initial dispatch concerned a
domestic dispute. He admitted he saw no evidence after arriving on the scene that
any weapons were involved or available, and this justification for the uninvited and
warrantless entry into the home has not been seriously advanced by the state at any
level of this litigation. In addition, there was no evidence offered by the state about
an attempt to obtain, or the inconvenience or delay in attempting to obtain a warrant
prior to entry.
The Court should also note that after she was escorted out of her home, Ms.
Finnicum was questioned about her activities that day, how much and what she had
to drink, when her last drink was, etc., pursuant to a DUI investigation, and then
required to submit to field sobriety tests. After the breath test, when she was told for
the first time she had a right to an attorney and a right to remain silent, she
immediately invoked her constitutional rights.
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Issues Presented on Appeal

1. May the police make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a residence in
order to effectuate a Terry stop?
2. Did the District Court properly rule that the Magistrate's decision was not
supported by either a factual record or a finding by the Magistrate that the warrantless
entry into the Respondent's home was justified by exigent circumstances?
Standard of Review

Respondent agrees with the Standard of Review set forth in Appellant's Brief.
Argument
I. State v. Maland does not authorize police entry into a home to complete
a Terry style seizure commenced outside the home

In State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 818 (2004), the Court held "that police
may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a residence in order to
effectuate a Terry stop .... "
"The State argues that the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment do
not prevent an officer from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a
suspect's home to effectuate a Terry stop, which began at the threshold of the
suspect's home. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Santana, this Court in
State v. Manthei, 130 Idaho 237 (1997), held that an officer's warrantless entry into
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a defendant's residence in order to complete the Terry stop did not violate the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. According to the Court in Manthei, there was
"no reason to distinguish between entry into a residence to complete a Terry stop and
entry to complete a probable cause-based arrest." Id. At 240. Manthei was wrongly
decided and must be overruled. Manthei has led to the erroneous argument that law
enforcement officers may enter a home to effectuate a Terry stop when there is no
probable cause for an arrest, nor exigent circumstances including, but not limited to,
officer or other's safety. [Citations omitted]. For the same reasons, State v. Hinson,
132 Idaho 110 (1998) was also wrongly decided and must be overruled." State v.
Maland, 140 Idaho at 823.

The state again argues, as it did in Manthei, that there is no "reason to
distinguish" entry in to a residence when the police have reasonable grounds to
suspect criminal activity under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), as
opposed to probable cause to arrest. This arguments ignores the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), as well as
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). In the former, the Court drew a clear

line protecting the sanctity of a home that may not be crossed absent probable cause
to arrest and exigent circumstances, and in the latter the Court held that no "seizure"

-Page 5-

occurs until there is a literal seizure of the person by the police. The argument that
the police seizure in this case occurred outside the home ignores California v.

Hodari D., and in any event is a distinction without a difference. The Court in
Maland was quite clear that no warrantless police entry is justified to "effectuate" a
Terry stop, and accordingly the District Court did not err in overruling the
Magistrate's decision.

II. Exigent circumstances were not present and did not authorize the
warrantless entry into the Respondent's home
As previously noted, there was no testimony or evidence at the suppression
hearing that an emergency existed and no time to obtain a warrant prior to the entry
into the Respondent's home. Neither officer expressed the concern for a loss of
evidence now advocated by the state, nor provided any testimony as to the time it
would take to obtain a warrant. More importantly, and contrary to the state's
inaccurate characterization of the trial Court's findings (See, Brief of Appellant, pp.
11- I 2), Judge Friedlander did not find that the entry was justified by exigent
circumstances. She simply found, as a "second basis", there was probable cause to
arrest. R., p. 41.
The state argues this is inconsequential, as the fact that probable cause existed
to arrest for a DUI ipso facto establishes exigent circumstances under Idaho law.
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Respondent disagrees with this analysis.
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the "seminal case" relied
upon by the state, a factual record supported the finding of an emergency that excused
the preference for a warrant. "We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood
¢{}

begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it
from the system." Brief of Appellant, p. 13, quoting Schmerber v. California. No
such evidence was provided to the trial Court in this case.
Furthermore, the "exigent circumstances exception does not apply where there
is time to secure a warrant." State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496,501 (Ct. App. 2007).
In Robinson, the "officers further testified regarding the impracticability of obtaining
a warrant at such a late night hour, saying it ordinarily took several hours." State v.
Robinson, supra at 501. No such evidence was offered to justify the warrantless
entry committed in this case. The District Court correctly declined to find such an
impediment exists, given telephonic warrants and the ease one may be obtained under
Idaho law. See, State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81 (2004). Accordingly, in the authorities
cited by the state, evidence was presented to the trial court from which a finding of
an emergency would support a warrantless entry into a home. No such evidence was
presented in this case.
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The officers' actions after entering and removing the Respondent from her
home belie any concern on their part about the loss of evidence. They interrogated
her, with first advising her of her constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), conducted their standardized field sobriety evaluations, and
waited until arriving at the Kootenai County Jail, over an hour after entry into her
home, before administering the alcohol analysis/breath test. No call was made for
a portable breath testing device, nor reason offered for this delay. These facts do not
lead to a finding by implication that a exigency existed, even though it may have been
"unarticulated" by the officers.
" ... at the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from umeasonable intrusion. In terms that apply
equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
The warrantless, nonconsensual entry into the home committed in this case was
unconstitutional and not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement, and
the Motion to Suppress should have been granted, as the District Court properly
found and ruled.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the decision of the
District Court be affirmed.
Dated t?-is

fl day of October, 2008.

~~-
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FREDERICK G. LOATS
Attorney for Respondent
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